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The decision in Wood v Jamison (2008) 167 CA4th 156, 83 CR3d 877, is based on mistake  
that attorneys might easily make. So we’ll use thatcase as an object lesson for these cautions. 
From the court’s sketchy summary of the facts, it appears that McComb, a smooth talker, 
persuaded Peterson, a little old lady, into financing and joint venturing a nightclub operation with 
him. After she depleted her own bank accounts for him, e took her to the office of attorney EBJ 
for her to get $250,000 by putting a mortgage on her house. EBJ, who appears to have already 
been representing McComb on some aspects of the nightclub project, discussed the mortgage 
loan with both McComb and Peterson and then subsequently did all the paperwork on that loan. 
(More facts will be mentioned as they become relevant.) EBJ ultimately ended up being held 
liable to Peterson for malpractice, breach of fiducary duty, and elder abuse. 
I. The Attorney-Client Relationship 
EBJ’s first mistake started when an existing client came into his office bringing a stranger 
along with him. EBJ should have immediately seen red flags waving. Any time two people come 
to an attorney, he or she has to be concerned about the potential of conflict of interest—whether 
the two visitors be brother and sister worrying about an ailing parent or one person just coming 
along to give the other moral support. Once both McComb and Peterson were in the same room 
with EBJ, he had to be concerned about whether he was creating a relationship with each of 
them—and, if so, what kind. If McComb was already his client (perhaps on this same matter), he 
was on dangerous ground in talking to Peterson. 
That does not mean that EBJ had to ask Peterson to leave at once. Two laypersons make a 
joint visit generally to economize on attorney fees; a complete refusal to speak to the second one 
is a good reason for people to dislike lawyers. But before letting them go too far in telling their 
story—and certainly before rendering any opinions—EBJ should have given them a preliminary 
lecture about what it would mean to be the lawyer for them both, including the impossible 
predicament he would be in if they were both his clents and later had a falling out. For his own 
safety, EBJ should also have invited questions from them, which would not only have given him 
further opportunities to explain the situation, but also enabled him to perceive how well they 
understood the situation and made him better able to judge how likely it was that a real conflict 
could arise (if that was not already inherent from the start). Agreeing, instead, to help Peterson 
get a loan was not a wise way to begin. 
If McComb and Peterson were both going to be clients, getting written conflict-of-interest 
waivers from both of them would have been the proper next step, although it bears remembering 
that such waivers will work only if the foundational and previous discussion of them was full and 
fair. EBJ did produce a waiver in court, and while it was easily rejected as coming in too late 
(five months after the trial) and too suspicious (mail from an anonymous source), the appellate 
court also rejected it on the ground that it had not been preceded by legal advice to Peterson on 
the issue of conflict of interest before she (allegedly) signed it. (Nor had EBJ—as is generally 
prudent—documented that her execution of the waiver had not been rushed and had been with 
knowledge of her right to consult someone else about it.) Merely having a waiver in the file does 
not do too much to help an attorney accused of confli t of interest. 
This particular waiver also failed, according to the court, because of the way it was worded. It 
referred only to Peterson’s joint venture with McComb, and not to EBJ’s services in getting the 
mortgage loan on her house, which were the activities that constituted EBJ’s malpractice. The 
court’s reasoning may tempt attorneys to draft broader waivers for clients to sign (since future 
requests for services are never completely foreseeabl ), but attempting to obtain a blanket waiver 
covering anything and everything may put the attorney o less at risk in the other direction. (It 
could well be that this court was not going to buy this waiver claim under any circumstances, and 
any statement about scope in the opinion was just a throwaway extra reason.) 
If one of the parties refuses to sign the waiver, the attorney thereafter has to deal with her on a 
clearly adversarial basis and constantly make sure that he never lulls her into thinking that he is 
doing anything as her lawyer. Given the services EBJ subsequently performed for Peterson, that 
would probably have been impossible. So our analysis of the case continues, on the assumption 
that a valid conflict waiver might have been, or was in fact, executed. But that only leads to the 
next ground of liability that was asserted against EBJ. 
II. Malpractice 
EBJ was guilty of malpractice, according to the court, not only because he failed to advise 
Peterson about his conflict of interest—covered above—but also because: 
• He put her into a bad loan. 
• He made a secret profit on that loan. 
a. The Loan Terms 
EBJ was held guilty of malpractice for obtaining an unsuitable loan, i.e., one that was certain 
to lead to foreclosure. His liability arose because he agreed to find a lender but then also took 
care of all of the paperwork involved in getting the loan. For the court, that loan work alone was 
“sufficient to support a finding that an attorney-client relationship existed.” That assistance also 
became the basis for imposing extra duties on EBJ to inquire into Peterson’s financial situation, 
the propriety of the loan terms, and, apparently, the wisdom of the investment being made with 
the loan funds. According to the court, EBJ should have sent Peterson to an independent 
investment advisor if he himself was not going to advise her about it. Sending a client to any 
other professional—loan broker, CPA, or financial advisor—would not only have reduced EBJ’s 
documentary tasks, but should have shifted the advisory responsibilities off his and onto other 
shoulders; that potential consequence should admonish attorneys not to lightly volunteer to be 
extra helpful. However, how much EBJ’s legal and ethical responsibilities (he was guilty of both 
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty) would have been reduced had he limited his services to 
less than the everything that he did is unclear; it is always difficult to predict safe stopping places 
along the slippery slope of doing more and more for the client. 
EBJ was also guilty of not advising Peterson that a nightclub venture was an inappropriate 
investment for her (although this sounds almost like an afterthought in the opinion). On that 
feature, attorneys are in notorious disagreement over the wisdom of making themselves into the 
financial advisors of their clients; it is not self- vident that assisting a client in obtaining a loan 
imposes on counsel a companion obligation to see that the loan proceeds are well spent. But if 
this part of the opinion is taken seriously, it represents a new risk for attorneys to consider. 
b. The Secret Profits 
EBJ was also held liable because he received a $4000 “referral fee” from Peterson’s lender 
and used her mortgage proceeds to get himself repaid for a $10,000 loan that he had earlier made 
to McComb. 
The court did not discuss whether EBJ could have legitimately taken this money had he not 
been acting as her attorney. There is no indication hat EBJ charged Peterson any kind of 
attorney fee. Perhaps such fees were paid by McComb, r perhaps EBJ thought of the funds he 
got from the loan as a substitute for attorney fees. P rhaps he believed that he was only acting as 
a kind of loan broker or loan finder for a nonclient, but since he was being treated as her 
attorney, nondisclosure of these two items was heldto be malpractice. Boyd Lemon, Peterson’s 
expert witness, opined that his conduct ran afoul of both Cal Rules of Prof Cond 3–310 (because 
he was rendering legal services to Peterson without disclosing the conflict) and 3–300 (because 
he was receiving a nonattorney’s fee out of a business transaction with a client that was 
disadvantageous to her). 
Those opinions make it unlikely that EBJ would have avoided liability if he had simply 
disclosed his receipts to Peterson. The fact that he was also held guilty of breaching fiduciary 
duties makes the relevance of her knowledge and consent even more problematic. But surely an 
attorney who discloses all sources of income to anyone affected by a transaction—whether or not 
he is attorney or the hearer is client—is less endangered than one who conceals that information. 
III. Elder Abuse 
EBJ was also held liable under the Elder Abuse Act (Welf & I C §15600) because Peterson 
was 78 years old and EBJ “took the undisclosed finder’s fee,” “knowingly aided and abetted 
McComb’s abusive scheme to take the $250,000,” and “k ew what the loan proceeds would be 
used for,” under circumstances in which “[a]ny attorney would know it was an inappropriate use 
of Peterson’s funds.” 
This highlights another hazard that attorneys must be alert to in handling real estate 
transactions for America’s growing elderly population. The Elder Abuse Act is so broad that EBJ 
could have been held liable under it even if he hadproperly avoided all of the attorney-client, 
malpractice, and fiduciary duty pitfalls discussed above. EBJ clearly came within the Act if he 
was representing the elderly Peterson, but also even if he was representing only the younger 
McComb in McComb’s deal with Peterson. EBJ had to do more; for his own protection, he 
needed either a videotape of his consultation with her, or a statement from a health care 
professional that she was of sound mind at all critical stages of the deal, even if it was 
embarrassing to tell her he had to take those steps. 
Financial elder abuse does not require an attorney-cli nt relationship. Nothing in §15610.30 
limits the definition of elder abuse to attorney-client relationships or makes full disclosure a 
defense against it. EBJ was held to have aided and abetted McComb in committing elder abuse 
by knowing that he was taking Peterson’s property for a wrongful purpose. 
Indeed, under the facts as described in the opinion, EBJ may have needed to affirmatively stop 
the deal once he knew Peterson was 78. That might have put him in trouble with his client 
McComb, but he should not have ignored the fact that Welf & I C §15657.5(a) provides for costs 
and attorney fees to a plaintiff who prevails in an elder abuse claim. Such fees are one-way, 
rather than bilateral, meaning that an attorney can end up owing them if he loses, but unable to 
recover them if he wins. See Wood v Jamison (2008) 167 CA4th 156, 83 CR3d 877. 
Professor Bernhardt gratefully acknowledges the contributions of his colleague Christine 
Tour-Sarkissian to this portion of this issue’s Midcourse Corrections column. Ms. Tour-
Sarkissian practices law in San Francisco and is Adjunct Professor of Law at Golden Gate 
University, teaching Real Estate Transactions and Real Estate Litigation. 
A Useful Book for Starting Lawyers 
I received a new book from the Real Property Trust & Estate Law Section of the ABA, 
entitled From Handshake to Closing: The Role of the Commercial Real Estate Lawyer, by 
Sidney Saltz (a well-known Chicago attorney). 
Now that I know of it, I will recommend this book to wo kinds of people in the future. First, I 
will recommend it to students who tell me that they ave just gotten a job doing real estate work 
for a law firm—I will tell them that this book is what they should read before they start work 
there, so that they will not have to risk embarrassing themselves asking too many questions that 
reveal how little they know. Second, I will recommend it to the lawyers I know at real estate 
firms when they complain that they spend too much time explaining the simple facts of law life 
to their new hires—I will advise them to just give those beginners a copy of this book and save 
themselves all that work. 
This book is filled with many of the tips and anecdotes that an acolyte needs in order to fit in 
more smoothly with the rest of the firm—e.g., when to draft a document herself or when to trust 
someone else to do it, or when to use a form instead. (Incidentally, there are some very useful 
form clauses with some excellent commentary accompanying them, although all of that is in the 
context of commercial leases.) 
What I would not recommend the book for is as a deskbook for reference to particular 
problems. Saltz’s informal style and organization make his text almost impossible to pick up and 
search for treatment of any individual item. It is really too bad that there is no index. (I had to use
a lot of post-it notes so that I could get back to points I wanted to remember.) I will advise my 
students: “Read this before you show up for the first day of work; after that you won’t have the 
time to go through it looking for an answer; and then store it in your bookshelf under commercial 
leases.” 
